education

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North West Provincial Government
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

NATIONAL SENIOR CERTIFICATE

GRADE 12

HISTORY P1

SEPTEMBER 2025

ADDENDUM

This addendum consists of 14 pages.

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QUESTION 1: WHY DID THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA GIVE FINANCIAL AID TO THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AFTER 1945?

SOURCE 1A

The source below explains the United States of America's intention to contain the spread of communism in Europe from 1947 onwards.

... United States officials in 1947 and 1948 did not have precise ideas about how to implement containment. Should containment be applied everywhere? Should it be applied militarily? Should the United States focus on economic aid to nations seeking to reconstruct their economies? Should the United States assign priority to occupation policies, especially in Germany and Japan?

Initially, in what became known as the Truman Doctrine, the United States president proposed military aid to Greece and Turkey, and declared that the United States would contest totalitarian expansion everywhere. But his subordinates quickly recognised that they had to calculate priorities carefully. They decided that they should focus on economic reconstruction in Western Europe rather than military rearmament; that they should seek to erode (wear down) support for communist parties in France, Italy, and Greece; that they should manage the revitalisation (recovery) of Western Germany and Japan, and co-opt (choose) their future power. Containment meant that Soviet influence and communist ideology should be contained within the areas occupied by the forces of the Soviet Union at the end of World War II.

In June 1947, the United States announced the Marshall Plan to help rebuild Europe. The governments of most Western European nations were happy to receive US money and participate in a reconstruction programme. But they possessed deep fears about the revival of German power. In order to get the French to cooperate, the United States promised to retain its occupation forces inside Germany.

[From http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/pons/s2-9143.pdf. Accessed on 04 November 2024.]

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SOURCE 1B

This source highlights the role that Dean Acheson, Deputy Secretary of State during George Marshall's administration, played in influencing the United States Congress to adopt Truman's policies in 1947.

... Acheson also played a vital role in shaping the political and economic institutions of Truman's Cold War. In early 1947, with Byrnes out and George Marshall in as the secretary of state, the anti-communist governments of Turkey and Greece claimed to be under severe Soviet pressure and could not guarantee their own survival. Convinced that the United States must help the Turkish and Greek governments, the administration nevertheless faced the difficult task of persuading a fiscally (financially) careful Congress to provide the aid needed to shore up (support) these governments.

On 27 February Truman called a meeting between administration officials and a handful of leading senators and members of congress in the hope of winning over the legislators. Acheson described this encounter as 'Armageddon' (a term used to describe the end of the world). Marshall spoke first, emphasising the need for the United States to act because it was the right thing to do and because no one else would help. The legislators seemed unmoved. Was it America's fight? Was the bill (cost) likely to be enormous? Acheson asked to speak.

Immediately he changed the terms of the debate. The crisis in South-eastern Europe, he said, was no local dust-up (small fight) but one that involved the two Cold War powers. The Soviets were pressuring Turkey and Greece as they had pressured Iran. At stake was a vast portion of the free world, for if Greece went communist, 'like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and Europe through Italy and France', which faced communist threats of their own. Only the United States stood in the way of a communist onslaught that would, if successful, snuff out freedom and destroy all hope of economic recovery in parts of three continents. The congressional leaders were impressed and the pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine followed on 12 March, promising that the United States would fight communism everywhere.

[From http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Cold-Warriors-Dean-acheson.html. Accessed on 04 November 2024.]

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SOURCE 1C

This source was written by an academic, Scott D Parrish, from the University of Texas in the United States of America. He analysed Evgenii Varga's (Soviet academic and economist) rejection of the Marshall Plan.

Varga put forward an economic explanation, arguing that 'the economic situation in the United States was the decisive (key) factor in putting forward the Marshall Plan proposal. The Marshall Plan is intended in the first instance to serve as a means of softening the expected economic crisis, the approach of which already no one in the United States denies'. Varga then went on to outline the dimensions (lengths) of the economic crisis, which he expected would soon overtake the United States. He anticipated a twenty per cent drop in production during this crisis, leading to the creation of a ten-million-man army of unemployed, and wreaking havoc (causing disaster) on the American banking system. As to the political effects of these economic difficulties, he concluded that 'the explosion of the economic and financial crisis will result in a significant drop in the foreign policy prestige (status) of the United States, which hopes to play the role of stabiliser of international capitalism'.

The Marshall Plan, wrote Varga, represented an attempt to forestall (prevent) this crisis. In his view, the United States found itself compelled (forced) to increase exports in order to avoid the onset of a serious economic depression. To accomplish such an increase in exports, the United States would grant credit to the European countries, even if they could not repay them. Varga observed that this expedient (action) would prove especially beneficial to 'monopoly capital'. He concluded:


'Seen against this background, the idea behind the Marshall Plan is the following: If it is in the interest of the United States itself to sell abroad American goods worth several billion dollars on credit to bankrupt borrowers, then it is necessary to attempt to gain from these credits the maximum political benefits.'

[From https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACFB73.pdf. Accessed on 04 November 2024.]

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SOURCE 1D

This cartoon was published in the *Krokodil*, a Soviet magazine, in 1948. It depicts the effects of the Marshall Plan.



[From *Essential Modern History* by S Waugh]

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QUESTION 2: HOW DID FOREIGN POWERS BECOME INVOLVED IN THE COLD WAR IN ANGOLA FROM 1975?

SOURCE 2A

This source explains how the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA fought over control of Angola after it attained independence in 1975.

Three main military movements had been fighting for Angolan independence since the 1960s. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was a Marxist organisation centred in the capital, Luanda, and led by Agostinho Neto. The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), led by Holden Roberto, was based in the north of the country and had strong ties to the US ally (friend), Mobutu Sese Seko, in neighbouring Zaire. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), an offshoot of the FNLA, was led by Jonas Savimbi and supported by the country's largest ethnic group, the Ovimbundu.

Following the Portuguese coup (revolution), these three revolutionaries met with representatives of the new Portuguese government in January 1975 and signed the Alvor Agreement that granted Angolan independence and provided for a three-way power sharing government. However, trust quickly broke down among the three groups, and the country descended (fell) into civil war as each vied (competed) for sole (total) power.

The crisis in Angola developed into a Cold War battleground as the superpowers and their allies delivered military assistance to their preferred clients. The United States supplied aid and training for both the FNLA and UNITA while troops from Zaire assisted Holden Roberto and his fighters. China also sent military instructors to train the FNLA. The Soviet Union provided military training and equipment to the MPLA. During the summer of 1975, the Soviet-supported MPLA was able to consolidate power in Luanda and oust (get rid of) the US-supported FNLA from the capital, but the FNLA continued to attack.

[From http://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/angola. Accessed on 4 November 2024.]

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SOURCE 2B

This source focuses on a speech that was delivered by the South African Prime Minister, BJ Vorster, in the House of Assembly in 1976. Vorster outlined the reasons for South Africa's intervention in the Cold War in Angola.

In the House of Assembly in January 1976 Vorster (South Africa's Prime Minister) placed the blame for South Africa's intervention in Angola squarely on the shoulders of the Russians and Cubans: 'Our involvement was the effect of Russian and Cuban intervention. If they did not enter Angola, if they did not take part in this affair, if they did not try to subvert (undermine) the whole of Angola and to suppress (contain) its people, South Africa would never have entered Angola at all ... We went in to chase Cuba and the MPLA away from the dams (Ruacana and Calueque).'

It can hardly be doubted that the support which the Russians and the Cubans gave to the MPLA in the form of arms and training contributed in some measure to motivating South Africa's intervention, but it is unlikely that it was as crucial a reason as Vorster implied. It was Swapo, not the Cubans and the MPLA, who threatened the two dams between Ruacana and Calueque. The main reason for South Africa's intervention in Angola was not the presence of Russians and Cubans, but the desire (longing) to prevent a hostile MPLA government from taking control. When South African troops began to invade Angola early in October, there were hardly any Russians and very few Cubans in the country.

There is also evidence that President Kaunda of Zambia and President Mobutu of Zaire, neither of whom favoured the MPLA, welcomed South Africa's support for the FNLA and UNITA.

... South Africa's actions drew her progressively (more and more) deeper into the Angolan war ... General Hendrik van den Bergh was sent to France to purchase weapons to the value of R20 million for the FNLA and UNITA ... South African instructors began to train FNLA and UNITA soldiers in southern Angola.

[From *South Africa in the 20th Century* by BJ Liebenberg and SB Spies (editors)]

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SOURCE 2C

Below is an extract from a speech delivered by the Cuban Prime Minister, Fidel Castro, in Havana on 19 April 1976. He outlines the reasons for Cuba's assistance to the MPLA.

On 5 November 1975, at the request of the MPLA, the leadership of our party decided to send with great urgency a battalion [division] of regular troops and anti-tank weapons to help the Angolan patriots resist the invasion of the South African racists. This was the first Cuban troop unit sent to Angola …

Cuba alone bears the responsibility of taking that decision. The USSR had always helped the people of the Portuguese colonies in their struggle for independence, provided besieged [surrounded] Angola with basic military equipment and collaborated [cooperated] with us when imperialism had cut off practically all our air routes to Africa. But it never requested that a single Cuban be sent to that country. The USSR is extraordinarily respectful and careful in its relations with Cuba. A decision of that nature could only be made by our own party.


Ford and Kissinger lie to the people of the United States and to world public opinion when they try to place the responsibility for Cuba's action in solidarity with Angola on the Soviet Union.

[From *Fidel Castro Speeches: Cuba's International Foreign Policy 1975–1980* by F Castro]

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SOURCE 2D

The following cartoon by Thomas Wright, an American artist, appeared in the *Miami News.* It was reprinted in the *Washington Post* on 7 December 1975. The cartoon depicts the involvement of the USSR and Cuba in Angola during the first phase of the Angolan Cold War, which was fought from 1975 to 1976.



[From *Conflicting Missions – Havana, Washington, Pretoria* by P Gleijeses]

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QUESTION 3: HOW DID THE BIRMINGHAM CAMPAIGNS CONTRIBUTE TO THE GRANTING OF CIVIL RIGHTS TO AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE 1960's?

SOURCE 3A

The source below has been extracted from an interview with reverend Joseph Ellwanger, a white Lutheran minister, who was part of the committee that organised the 1963 Birmingham Campaign.

Birmingham in 1963 was about as segregated a city in the South as you can find. There were still signs over the water fountains. There were no black clerks in the downtown stores. There were no blacks in the police or fire department. And there were a lot of open threats on the part of the police commissioner, Bull Connor, against any attempt to gain some of these rights …

There was not only the belief in the white community that blacks were inferior, but that belief was clearly articulated and was assumed as the basis for the segregation that had existed all these years … many members of the Ku Klux Klan had … almost a religious belief in their hearts, that we've got to maintain that kind of purity of the race or otherwise we're dooming ourselves and our future generation.

As we think about what white people were afraid of in terms of the possibility of an integrated society, part of it was simply the fear of the unknown. Perhaps even deeper was the fear of the Ku Klux Klan and their threats becoming a reality. In Birmingham, we had something like forty bombings in the previous ten years, so it was not an idle threat …

My role in the Birmingham demonstrations was basically being part of a committee of twenty that met to do the planning … I can still remember those sessions with Dr King and Ralph Abernathy and Andrew Young, and it was an amazing experience of an openness towards everybody's ideas. There was no one who was not given the opportunity to help participate in the planning.

[From *Voices of Freedom. An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement* by Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer]

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SOURCE 3B

The source below focuses on the strategies adopted by protestors, the reaction by state authorities and the impact of media coverage of the Birmingham campaign in 1963.

The Birmingham campaign began quietly with sit-ins on 3 April 1963 at several downtown 'whites-only' lunch counters. From the outset, the campaign confronted an apathetic (uninterested) black community, an openly hostile established black leadership and Bull Connor's 'non-violent resistance' in the form of police arrests of the offenders of the city's segregation ordinances. With no sensational news, the national media found nothing to report, and the campaign floundered (declined). But when Connor ordered out police dogs to disperse a crowd of black bystanders, journalists recorded the attack of a German shepherd on a nonviolent protester, thereby revealing the brutality that undermined segregation ...

In a desperate bid to generate media coverage and to keep the campaign alive ... the Children's Campaign was launched on 2 May 1963, in which black youth from area schools (state schools) served as demonstrators. Trying to avoid the use of force, Bull Connor arrested hundreds of school children and hauled them off to jail on school buses. When the jails were filled, he called out fire hoses and police dogs to contain large protests ... African American spectators responded with outrage, pelting police with bricks and bottles as firemen opened up the hoses.


The media captured the negative images of Connor and his men suppressing the non-violent protest of school children with brutal blasts of water cannons and attacks from police dogs. Front page photographs in the nation's newspapers convinced President Kennedy to send the assistant attorney-general for Civil Rights, Burke Marshall, to Birmingham to secure negotiations that would end the violent demonstrations.

[From http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/face/Article.jsp?id=h-1358. Accessed on 04 November 2024.]

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SOURCE 3C

This photograph appeared in the *Daily News* during the Birmingham Campaign, 1963. It shows firemen who had been ordered to use their high-pressure hoses on civil rights protestors who are seated on the pavement.



[From http://www.dailynews.com. Accessed on 04 November 2024.]

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SOURCE 3D

This is an extract from a televised speech given to the American public by President JF Kennedy on 11 June 1963 in reaction to events in Birmingham and other protests elsewhere.

The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights and equal opportunities, whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be treated. If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat lunch in a restaurant open to the public, if he cannot send his children to the best public school available, if he cannot vote for the public officials who represent him, if, in short, he cannot enjoy the full and free life which all of us want, then who among us would be content to have the colour of his skin changed and stand in his place? ...

Now the time has come for this nation to fulfil its promise. The events in Birmingham and elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality that no city or state or legislative body can prudently (wisely) choose to ignore them.

The fires of frustration and discord are burning in every city, north and south, where legal remedies are not at hand. Redress is sought in the streets, in demonstrations, parades, and protests which create tensions and threaten violence and threaten lives.

We face, therefore, a moral crisis as a country and as a people. It cannot be met by repressive police action. It cannot be left to increased demonstrations in the streets. It cannot be quieted by token moves or talk. It is a time to act in the Congress, in your state and local legislative body and, above all, in all of our daily lives …

Next week I shall ask the Congress of the United States to act, to make a commitment it has not fully made in this century to the proposition that race has no place in American life or law …

[From http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/kennedy/civilrightsmessage.html. Accessed on 04 November 2024.]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

Castro, F. *Fidel Castro Speeches: Cuba's International Foreign Policy 1975–1980*

Hampton, H and Fayer, S. *Voices of Freedom. An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement*

Gleijeses, P. *Conflicting Missions – Havana, Washington, Pretoria*

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